Does lawmaker behavior influence electoral outcomes? Observational studies cannot elucidate the effect of legislative proposals on electoral outcomes, since effects are confounded by unobserved differences in legislative and political skill. We take advantage of a unique natural experiment in the Canadian House of Commons that allows us to estimate how proposing legislation affects election outcomes. The right of non-cabinet members to propose legislation is assigned by lottery. Comparing outcomes between those who were granted the right to propose and those who were not, we show that incumbents of the governing party enjoy a 2.5 percentage point bonus in the election following the introduction of a single piece of legislation, which translates to a 7% increase in the probability of winning. The causal effect results from more campaign donations and higher likeability amongst constituents. These results demonstrate experimentally that what politicians do as lawmakers has a causal effect on electoral outcomes.
Introduction
A unifying theme in the debate over the meaning of representation is the idea that representatives should take action on behalf of their constituents. Democratic theory is contingent on this notion of representation, as it is built on the assumption that citizens can use elections to reward or punish legislators for the actions taken on their behalf (Downs 1957 , Riker 1982 . The responsiveness of voters to representatives' actions-and the reciprocal sensitivity on the part of representatives to the voters' preferences-is a vital part of a functioning democracy. While these questions of representation and accountability are of the utmost importance in political science, measuring the effects of legislator action on subsequent voter behavior has proven to be a thorny problem for legislative scholars.
At the root of this problem is measuring the causal effect of legislative action.
Observational studies preclude us from separating the effect of legislating from other characteristics of the individual legislator or political system that may confound the independent effect of introducing legislation. In systems where legislators have significant independence to introduce legislation, such as the United States, legislators who introduce successful legislation are more likely to be skilled politicians, adept at claiming credit for legislative initiatives and turning their performance into electoral advantage. An association between passing laws and electoral success may result from a spurious relationship where legislators who pass laws are also good at raising money for their campaigns (Gerber 1998 ).
Other single member district legislatures, such as the British or Canadian parliamentary systems, empower executive leaders to introduce legislation and discipline Members of Parliament to ensure its passage, thereby constraining the ability of representatives to act directly on behalf of their constituents (Kam 2009 ). Moreover, the tendency of parties to give high-profile parliamentary positions to potential party leaders and parliamentary positions that are of most value for re-election to vulnerable legislators suggests that parties reserve the privilege of introducing legislation for their most valuable or most vulnerable politicians (Pekkanen et al. 2006) . Without being able to separate the independent effect of legislative action from these other possible explanations of electoral viability, we cannot be certain of a causal relationship between legislating and winning elections.
Here, we harness a unique natural experiment to understand the influence of legislative activity on electoral outcomes. Since 2004, the right of non-cabinet members to introduce a single piece of legislation in the Canadian House of Commons is randomly assigned by the office of the Speaker of the Commons. By comparing electoral outcomes between those who were given the power to propose legislation and those who were not, we can evaluate experimentally whether a real world democratic institution causes the electorate to reward legislators for their legislative action. We show that the power to propose imparts a significant electoral advantage to members of the governing party. We further show that this causal effect is not influenced by an increase in media attention or a decrease in the quality of the proposing legislator's opponents. Instead, we find that the ability to pass legislation is associated with a significant increase in the amount of money legislators raise, which helps to explain why the power to propose helps members of the governing party win re-election.
Furthermore, we show that both the power to propose and bill passage are associated with an increased share of constituents who report a personal preference for the legislator.
Our results suggest that talented politicians take advantage of legislative opportunities and that voters reward them for doing so. That we find a strong relationship in a parliamentary system which deemphasizes the role of the individual legislator and emphasizes party loyalty over constituency service (Lee 2005) suggests that these effects may be widespread and even more pronounced in legislative systems that allow representatives to better capitalize on and publicize actions taken on behalf of their constituents. Democratic theory hinges on a tight and reciprocal relationship between constituents and their representatives; that voters support candidates who are more actively involved in the legislative process is a sign that this relationship matters in practice in contemporary representative democracies, as well.
Literature Review
A vast literature in economics, sociology, psychology, game theory, and political science is aimed at understanding the effect of voters on legislator behaviour and vice versa ( Stimson et al. 1995, Fowler and Smirnov 2007) . Both theory and empirical analysis support the idea that representatives are attuned to the needs and wants of their constituents.
Mayhew's articulation of the "electoral connection" (1974) suggests that legislators act as if they were single-minded seekers of re-election: advertising, claiming credit and taking positions in order to signal to their constituents their quality as representatives.
Representatives want to be seen as acting on behalf of the constituency's interests, and consequently are sensitive to the preferences of their constituents; evidence from both the U.S. House and Senate support this notion Stokes 1963, Griffin and Newman 2005 ).
The evidence is more mixed as to whether voters can, and do, respond to legislative performance. Critics of democratic theory argue that voters are insufficiently informed to respond to legislative action, and much of the political behavior literature suggests that most voters do not follow the details of legislators' actions or individual policy stances (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992 ), even if they are able to come to political decisions via low information rationality (Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998) . As a consequence, "constituency control" is a "myth" (Arnold 1993) ; only the most attentive voters are aware of representatives' efforts to bring benefits to constituents (Stein and Bickers 1994) . Conversely, others have provided evidence that voters do respond to the behavior of governments (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002) , parties (Stimson et al. 1995) , and individual legislators (Mayhew 1974) , and that legislators are able to cultivate a "personal vote" through their actions (Cain et al 1987, Ferejohn and Gaines 1991) .
The difficulty of adjudicating between competing findings is made more difficult by the fact that these empirical tests of democratic theory have been based on observational studies (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000, Besley and Case 2003, Kitschelt 2000) . This is particularly problematic for understanding the causal effect of legislator behavior within democratic institutions since differences in rules may be confounded with differences in the personal attributes of legislators. For example, if we find that there is a positive association between passing laws and winning elections, it may be a spurious correlation resulting from the tendency of legislators who pass many laws to also be those who are good at raising money for re-election campaigns (Gerber 1998) . While intuitively it seems plausible that what politicians do as lawmakers has a causal effect on the behavior of their constituents, and a strong circumstantial case for this in the literature has become the generally accepted view among legislative scholars, the fact remains that this has not been clearly demonstrated in extant studies.
Scholars have increasingly turned to experiments to answer important questions about political behavior (Druckman et al. 2006) . However, these experiments often occur in the lab (Levine and Palfrey 2007) or within surveys (Loewen 2010) . When they occur in the field they most often do so in non-competitive contexts (Wantchekon 2003) or relatively inconsequential elections (Green et al. 2003 , Gerber et al. 2008 ). This has severely limited the external validity of inferences about the causal effect of various institutions and the ability to test the most fundamental assumptions about how democracy works.
This paper provides novel experimental evidence that the right to propose legislation is valuable for members of Canada's governing party, bringing them campaign contributions, popularity with their constituents, and, consequently, increased votes in the next election.
While this finding is consistent with the commonly accepted notion of voter behavior generated by decades of observational work, it is the first paper to cleanly test whether this relationship is a causal one. Our results are intuitive but offer a much-needed confirmation of the theory that voters do hold their representatives accountable for legislative action.
Finally, our data allows us to answer questions about why the power to propose might have an effect. The first possible mechanism is the media effect. Members who introduce and/or pass legislation create opportunities for more frequent coverage in the media, and media coverage (Brians and Wattenberg 1996) , newspaper editorials (Dalton, Beck and Huckfeldt 1998) , and television news programs (Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982) have all been demonstrated to affect voters' considerations and preferences with regards to issues and candidates. A strategic politician may also be able to use their proposal power to develop issue ownership (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994) . The second is the quality opponent explanation. Quality challengers are more likely to be successful in their campaigns against incumbents (Van Dunk 1997) but act strategically to maximize their chances of winning (Jacobson 1987 (Jacobson , 1989 (Jacobson , 1990 Cox and Katz 1996; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Carson, Engstrom and Roberts 2007) . The power to propose and pass popular legislation may create a signal of incumbent strength that leads to the strategic deterrence of quality opponents in the next election. The third mediating effect is that of campaign resources. Incumbents have easier access to mechanisms of campaign fundraising than do challengers (Jacobson 1987 (Jacobson , 1989 ), but incumbents who have successful legislative records may be especially wellpositioned to capitalize on their advantage. Consistent with Mayhew's theory, legislative candidates may use their proposed legislation to claim credit and stake out positions on important issues, which may help them garner more resources during the following election in the form of donations. These additional funds can then be translated into more votes, via campaign expenditures. Finally, the popularity explanation suggests that members who introduce and/or pass legislation may become better liked by their constituents, increasing the probability that they, rather than their party or its leader, will prove pivotal in the decision of voters. Backbench MPs in the Canadian Parliament have little leverage in obtaining concessions for their constituents; moreover, because voters recognize the degree of centralization in the policy process, a legislator has little chance to persuade voters based on their reputation for service or policy initiative (Lee 2005) . Thus, any opportunity, albeit small (Cover and Brumberg 1982) , for legislators to distinguish themselves may lead to increased name recognition and popularity, two factors positively associated with vote choice (Mann and Wolfinger 1980, Goldenberg and Traugott 1980) .
Our results indicate that the power to propose and subsequently pass legislation causes a significant increase in the amount of money a legislator can raise as well as the legislator's popularity with his or her constituents. These tests of mediation clarify the causal story linking legislator action with voter behavior and help elucidate one of the most important remaining puzzles in the study of representation. 
Data and Methods

Data in this experiment
Treatment: Power to Propose
Prior to 2004, a parliamentary committee exercised significant control over which members' proposals would be deemed "votable" and thus eligible for debate, consideration, and passage (Blidook 2010 ). However, a new system was adopted in the 37 th Parliament We denote a member as being in the treatment group if they had the power to propose and adequate time for their bill to be considered for second reading, the stage at which debate over bills takes place. This threshold is determined by the position of the MP lowest in the Order of Precedence who was successful in introducing their legislation for second reading.
In our data, this resulted in MPs who received one of the top N spots on the Order of Precedence. By this measure, we have 79 members in treatment and 126 in control in the 37 th parliament and 86 members in treatment and 108 in control in the 39 th parliament.
To ensure the randomization of the lottery, we have compared members who did and did not receive the power to propose across several key metrics. We find that government members are not more likely than opposition members to receive the power to propose (Table   A1 , in Appendix). Second, the average number of years served in parliament is no different among the treatment and control groups (Table A2 ). There is no difference in the likelihood of former cabinet ministers being in treatment (Table A2 ). There is no difference in rates of treatment by gender (Table A2 ). Furthermore, χ 2 tests suggest no differences in treatment rates by province in either the 37 th parliament (χ 2 = 7.10, p=.72), the 38 th parliament (χ 2 = 15.29, p=.12), or both parliaments combined (χ 2 = 10.02, p=.44). Finally, there is no difference in decisions to retire among those in treatment and control, suggesting that members do not retire at a greater rate when not granted the power to propose (Tables A3 and   A4 ). These checks ensure that there are no significant differences between our treatment and control groups.
Not all members take up the opportunity to propose legislation. In 2006, of the 79 incumbents who would run for re-election and who were granted the power to propose, 13 chose not to do so. In 2008, out of 86 incumbents, only 3 chose not to propose. We include members who choose not to propose in our treatment group because we wish to measure the pure causal effect of the institution on the outcome. If we exclude those who chose not to introduce, we may create a confound in the analysis, since the decision not to introduce may result from self-evaluation of MPs' ability to succeed in converting an opportunity to propose into electoral advantage. Accordingly, the effects we present are equivalent to "intent to treat" effects (Sheiner and Rubin 1995) .
Model and Hypotheses
We take advantage of randomization in the Order of Precedence to measure the causal effect of proposing legislation on vote share in the following election. Our analysis considers all incumbents who ran for re-election in 2006 and/or 2008 (so that we can measure vote share) and who were eligible for inclusion on the Order of Precedence via their draw in the lottery.
Members of the cabinet are ineligible.
Our key explanatory variables are vote share in the previous election, membership in the government party, the randomly assigned opportunity to propose legislation, and an interaction between membership in the governing party and the power to propose. The linear combination of this interaction term and the variable for the power to propose captures our key finding, namely that government candidates receive an electoral boost from the chance to propose and debate legislation but opposition members do not. We expect government (Carty et al. 2000) , opposition members may only be able to advance legislation that is uncontroversial and unlikely to lead to electoral advantage. Finally, we note that our study covers parliaments in which the Liberal party was in government (2004) (2005) and when the Conservative party was in government (2006) (2007) (2008) . Accordingly, our results are not confounded by the partisanship of the government.
Results
We first conduct basic t-tests that compare the vote share of those with the power to propose (the treatment) to those without (the control). We then conduct a regression analysis of vote share. Both sets of results validate our main hypothesis. . It has no effect for opposition members (p=.57, two-tailed) (See Table A1 in Appendix for treatment rates and Table A5 for additional t-tests).
Principal Effects
To ensure that these results are not driven by random imbalance in other factors that influence vote totals, we conduct a linear regression analysis ( Table 1) [ Table 1 about here]
Potential Mediators
We have performed further analysis to explore why government members were able to translate the proposal of legislation into vote increases. We identify four potential factors that may mediate the relationship between the power to propose and an increased vote share in the subsequent election: the media effect, quality opponent, campaign resources, and popularity hypotheses described above. Two of the explanations do not find support in our results: the media effect and quality opponent hypotheses. We measure media coverage as the number of times an MP was mentioned in Canadian newspapers during the Parliament prior to the election. We fail to find evidence of an association between proposal power and the quantity 13 of media mentions (p=.74, two-tailed t-test). Government members who received the power to propose were no more frequently cited in newspaper articles in the preceding Parliament than those government members who did not receive the power to propose. We also fail to find an association between proposal power and the presence of quality challengers. In concordance with past research, we define quality challengers as candidates who have previously held provincial or federal office (Jacobson 1989 , Van Dunk 1997 . Government members granted the power to propose were no less likely to face quality challengers (p=.95,
two-tailed t-test). Nor is there an association between bill passage and media mentions or quality challengers (two-tailed t-test p-values of .57 and .30 respectively).
Conversely, the campaign resources and popularity hypotheses do find support.
Proposal power is related to campaign resources: government members who pass legislation have more resources on hand to fight the subsequent election. We measure these resources by combining the amount that members have received through (1) direct donations and (2) indirect donations made to their district associations and then transferred to their campaigns.
As Table 2 demonstrates, although the association between proposal power and money is not significant, proposal power is a necessary precondition for bill passage, and the association between bill passage and campaign donations is significant. Members of the government who pass legislation raise about 27% (95% C.I. 10% to 45%) more money as a share of their spending limit than those who had the power to propose legislation but were unsuccessful in passage. 1 Moreover, money is significantly associated with an increase in vote share from the previous election for government members (Pearson's r=0.21, p=.037). Finally, note that the average donations to members who passed and did not pass legislation were $299 and $302 respectively. Therefore, successful government members increased the number of donations rather than the average size of each donation. This is an important finding for Canadian incumbents particularly because Canada's party finance laws sharply limit the monetary value of individual contributions, creating incentives for candidates to solicit a large number of small contributions (Young 2004) .
[ Table 2 Table 3 presents these results. Comparing constituencies with a government incumbent, respondents were more likely to identify that incumbent as a candidate they particularly liked when the member had the power to propose than when they did not. When we compare those government members who passed legislation to government members with proposal power who did not pass legislation, we find an even larger difference.
[ Table 3 about here]
Discussion
Our results suggest that incumbents of the governing party are rewarded when they have the opportunity to propose legislation. This causal relationship functions by increasing the incumbent's ability to fundraise in the next election and by increasing his or her popularity with constituents.
It is important to remember that intermediate variables like money raised and voter preferences were not randomly assigned. The ability of formal mediation tests to uncover the causal pathway from proposal power to electoral victories is thus limited (Green et al. 2010) .
For example, a legislator's interpersonal skills may influence both the ability to raise money and the ability to pass legislation when given the opportunity. But the lack of association with media attention and quality challengers suggests that we can rule out those explanations for the causal effect of proposal power on electoral outcomes. What remains, then, is a mechanism whereby talented legislators of the governing party may take advantage of the power to propose legislation and turn it into votes by attracting more donations and improving personal reactions by voters. This mechanism suggests that proposal power is a necessary but not sufficient condition for electoral reward. Talented members of the governing party are able to turn the power to propose into electoral reward if they are successful in advancing their legislation. However, no such equivalent opportunity exists for government members without the power to propose or for any opposition members.
However, despite these caveats, the power to propose has profound implications for election outcomes. Using the estimates in Table 1, This natural experiment provides evidence of the effect of legislative activity in one country, but it also suggests possible effects in other democracies as well. Compared to its peers, the Canadian legislative system is highly disciplined and dominated by the cabinet (Malloy 2003) . Members of Parliament face a high degree of turnover (Blake 1991) and lack legislative specialization (Docherty 1997) . By one prominent account, they are legislative "amateurs" (Atkinson and Docherty 1992) . That a single legislative action would matter in Canada suggests that similar actions would matter in other democracies such as the U.S.
where lawmakers have greater freedom to propose legislation (Fowler 2006a (Fowler , 2006b ), the outcome is less dependent on party dynamics, candidates can raise substantially more money from a broader array of sources, and incumbent re-election is more dependent on candidate factors (Wattenberg 1991) . In particular, our results provide evidence of the ability of the electorate to reward specific legislators, even in a parliamentary system characterized by strong party discipline (in contrast to previous assertions (Hellwig and Samuels 2007) ). More broadly, our results highlight the need to search for unique opportunities to exploit randomization in real world political activity to understand how democratic systems work (Bhavnani 2009 ). OLS regression of vote share on variables shown. All p-values are two-tailed. Standard errors are clustered on Members of Parliament The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 2.56 percentage points (95% C.I. 0.08, 5.03). This shows that members of the government who are randomly granted the right to propose legislation on average earn 2.56 percentage points more vote share than those government members who are not. Columns four and five compare the effects of passing legislation among those who had the power to propose. χ 2 tests of association are presented in the bottom row. The tests suggest that both proposal power and passage increase preferences for local government incumbents.
Tables
Appendix: Treatment Balance Tests and Robustness Checks
In Table A1 , we present treatment rates for the 37 th and 38 th Parliaments for government and opposition members. We show that treatment rates do not differ significantly between government and opposition members in either Parliament. Likewise, treatment rates do not differ for either government members or opposition members between Parliaments.
In Table A3 , we compare differences on a number of variables between those who were and were not treated. The lack of significant differences suggests that the lottery for the power to propose was a random draw.
In Tables A3 and A4 , we examine whether the right to propose legislation was related to whether incumbents contested the next election (or, "reoffered"). If proposal power is related to reoffering, then another layer of potential selection effects may be present, confounding our analysis. These tables demonstrate that this is not occurring, as proposal power and place on the order of precedence are statistically unrelated to reoffering.
In Table A5 , we present average current and previous vote shares for those in treatment and control by government/opposition and then by Parliament. Treatment vote shares are for legislators who were assigned the power to propose regardless of whether they in fact proposed legislation.
Tables A6 and A7 present robustness checks of our main result, using a Huber regression and a non-parametric, quantile regression. Both results confirm our principal finding of a significant increase in vote share for government incumbents who have the power to propose legislation. The final column tests for the differences between untreated and treated members on a number of observable characteristics. The lack of statistically significant differences suggests that the lottery was in fact a random draw. We have also conducted non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests of difference and found no significant differences. Finally, an F-test suggests that treatment is jointly unrelated to years in parliament, status as an former minister, and gender (F(3, 395)=.98, p=.40). Logistic regression showing the relationship between place in the order of precedence and reoffering. Place in the order of precedence is n/N, where n is an individual legislator's place on the order of precedence and N is the total number of individuals on the order. The dependent variable reads 0 for members who choose not to contest the next election and 1 for those incumbents who did choose to contest the next election. These results show that place on the paper as measured was statistically unrelated to the decision to reoffer. Logistic regression showing the relationship between the power to propose and reoffering. The power to propose is measured 0 for those whose place on the order of precedence was after that of the last member to introduce a piece of legislation for second reading, and 1 for those who were not after this individual. The dependent variable reads 0 for members who choose not to contest the next election and 1 for those incumbents who did choose to contest the next election. These results show that proposal power as measured was statistically unrelated to the decision to reoffer. This table presents additional descriptive statistics concerning the current and previous vote shares. The treatment category includes all members who were assigned the right the propose legislation, including those who chose not to introduce legislation. Accordingly, we present intent to treat effects. Huber regression of vote share on variables shown. All p-values are two-tailed. The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 2.56 percentage points (95% C.I. 0.05, 5.06). This shows that members of the government who are randomly granted the right to propose legislation on average earn 2.56 percentage points more vote share than those government members who are not. Quantile regression of vote share on variables shown. All p-values are two-tailed. The linear combination of Power to Propose and Government * Power to Propose is 2.83 percentage points (95% C.I. 0.84,4.83), suggesting that the median vote share among government incumbents with the power to propose is significantly larger than that of government incumbents without the power to propose.
